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Abstract
Image authentication, which is provided with capabilities of tamper detection and data recovery, is an efficient
way to protect the contents of digital images. Vector quantization (VQ) is a data compression method. A VQ-
compressed code is not only a significant image authentication feature but also applicable in restoring possibly
damaged pixels. However, if an image is tampered with, the necessary recovery information disappears. To solve
this problem, this paper proposes a quantization-based image authentication scheme using two-dimensional (2D)
barcodes to protect important features. Compared with older linear barcodes, 2D barcodes are a machine-readable
representation of binary data that possess capabilities of location and tolerance. This paper presents a method for
incorporating VQ-compressed code into 2D barcodes and embedding those barcodes into the image itself.
Experimental results showed that VQ codes can be completely reserved during data recovery even though quick
response codes sustain certain perceptible distortions. Moreover, the proposed scheme provided higher quality
authenticated and recovered images compared with previous methods.
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1 Introduction
Because of the extremely rapid advancements in com-
puter technology and the Internet, an increasing number
of people use digital devices, mobile phones, and tablets
for data communication. As a result, more and more
image and video data are emerged [1]. People cannot
only deliver but access multimedia data anywhere on the
Internet in a short time. These multimedia data, espe-
cially the images and videos, are frequently used in com-
puter vision application, for instance, feature detection,
object recognition [2], visual surveillance [3], photo clus-
tering, and virtual navigation in photos [4, 5]. However,
some security issues exist because of open unsafe net-
works. Data transmitted over networks are regularly sub-
ject to active attacks [6], such as the erasing and
tampering of documents or images. Destructive modifi-
cations often cause the content of multimedia data to be
inaccurate and further incur the difficulty or consider-
able errors for subsequent computer vision application.
In general, cryptographic methods are applied to pro-
tect the security of digital data by using encryption keys.
Without the correct key, illegal attackers cannot acquire
the original data. However, encryption and decryption
procedures are time-consuming processes, and they are
thus not suitable for high-volume multimedia data [7],
digital images, and videos. Image authentication [7, 8] is
one of the techniques for protecting the content integ-
rity of digital images from malicious and unauthorized
modification. Image authentication technology can de-
tect and indicate any changes or tampered regions in a
tampered image. Image authentication schemes are clas-
sified into two categories: active authentication [8–18]
and passive authentication [19–21] schemes. The active
authentication scheme involves extracting particular fea-
tures of the image beforehand and then concealing them
within the image itself, whereas the passive authentica-
tion scheme entails authenticating images with no prior
information requirement. The active image authentica-
tion approach is also called fragile watermarking [12],
which involves hiding a watermark in an image. The hid-
den watermark is highly sensitive to any modifications in
the image such that it becomes fragile and even
unrecognizable when the image is modified. Hence, spe-
cific locations that have been illegally modified can easily
be indicated using these broken areas.
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Wong and Memon [16] proposed the public key fra-
gile watermarking scheme for image authentication. This
scheme applies block pixels, block index, and other re-
lated information to produce a signature as authentica-
tion data. Chen and Wang [12] applied a fuzzy c-means
clustering technique to build the relationship between
blocks for image authentication. In addition, Wu and
Ren [8] proposed a scheme that entails using distinctive
rules of a Sudoku puzzle to create authentication data.
Chan [9] rearranged image pixel bits by using the ham-
ming code technique for detecting tampered regions.
Subsequently, Chen and Chen [10] employed the coeffi-
cients in low-frequency wavelet subbands for preventing
malicious tampering. The schemes that have been pro-
posed in [14] and [15] involve applying block truncation
coding and singular value decomposition, respectively,
on image blocks to obtain authentication data. The
aforementioned schemes are self-embedding methods of
embedding the authentication data of an image into each
spatial pixel bits. Moreover, all schemes provide tamper
detection ability.
In addition to the described schemes, other methods
with data recovery abilities are available, and such
methods can restore possibly damaged regions to a state
close to the original. Wang and Tsai [17] presented an
automatic image authentication and recovery method
applying a fractal encoding technique to the region of
importance. This approach further uses the image
inpainting technique to recover tampered areas for im-
proving the quality of the recovered image. Yang and
Shen [18] drew an index table through vector
quantization (VQ) from the image content and used it
as the important authentication and recovery data. In
2001, Wu and Hsieh [13] also used VQ coding to im-
prove the embedded image quality. Chuang et al. [11]
acquired the VQ indices for an image and then embed-
ded multiple copies of them into other image blocks.
When the image is to be authenticated, particular for-
ward and backward detection mechanisms are designed
to detect tampered regions more precisely.
In contrast to earlier studies, Chen and Chen [10] of-
fered a distinct solution for image authentication in
2012. They employed a fashionable quick response (QR)
code to protect the authentication data from being dam-
aged or going missing. A QR code, an extension of the
traditional linear barcode, is a type of two-dimensional
(2D) matrix code. It introduces the vertical dimension,
thus enabling the encoding of more data. Figures 1 and
2 depict images of a traditional barcode and novel QR
code, respectively. Notably, a QR code consists of black
and white dots arranged in a square; it also contains spe-
cial position detection patterns placed in three corners
[22] that enable it to be scanned from any direction and
still be decoded correctly. QR codes are usually used to
represent concise text, product information, and web hy-
perlinks. A QR code has not only a large capacity for
data storage but also four levels (L, M, Q, and H) of
error correction. The higher the level of error correction
is, the larger the QR code size is and the greater the
error correction becomes. This property enables QR
codes to be read correctly even if slightly soiled or dam-
aged. Thus, error correction renders QR codes more
powerful and useful.
Through QR codes, Chen and Chen’s scheme can ob-
tain correct authentication data to verify image integrity.
However, the scheme requires the original image to indi-
cate the tampered regions. Moreover, the scheme does
not have data recovery ability. Therefore, the scheme
does not make good use of the error correction property
of QR codes. In this study, we developed a QR code-
based image authentication scheme that applies VQ
Fig. 1 Traditional barcode
Fig. 2 QR code for the URL “http://au.edu.tw”
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indices to address this problem and improve the embed-
ded image quality. The rest of this paper is organized as
follows. Section 2 provides a review of VQ coding and
some previous relevant schemes [10, 18]. Section 3
presents the proposed image authentication scheme.
Section 4 presents the experimental results showing the
improvement associated with using the proposed
scheme. The final section presents our conclusions.
2 Related methods
The proposed scheme integrates VQ coding and QR
codes to achieve image tamper detection and data recov-
ery. Therefore, this section first reviews the basic con-
cepts of VQ in Section 2.1. Subsequently, two relevant
schemes [10, 18] of image authentication are presented
in Sections 2.2 and 2.3.
2.1 VQ coding
VQ [23] is a prominent lossy data compression tech-
nique that guarantees the achievement of a satisfactory
balance between image fidelity and compression ratio.
Because of its easy implementation and simple decoding
structure, the VQ technique has been widely used in a
variety of research fields [24]. The concept of this tech-
nique is to replace original image blocks with represen-
tative patterns for the purpose of data compression. VQ
comprises three procedures: (1) visual codebook gener-
ation, (2) image block quantization, and (3) index decod-
ing. The codebook CB = {C1, C2, …, CNc} is a set of
representative visual image vectors derived from the
Linde-Buzo-Gray training algorithm [23], and each sig-
nificant vector Ci is called a codeword. The generation
of the codebook determines the performance of the VQ
coding. VQ-based image quantization involves partition-
ing an image into numerous fixed-sized blocks and then
comparing them with codewords in the codebook to find
the closest pattern for each input vector. On the side of
the VQ encoder, each of the input blocks is compressed
into an index of the codebook. That index is associated
with the codebook during the index decoding procedure
to rapidly reconstruct the corresponding block through
a table lookup operation.
Figure 3 shows the flowchart of VQ image encoding
and decoding. Consider, for example, a grayscale image I
of W ×H pixels subjected to VQ coding. Initially, it is
necessary to prepare the codebook CB containing Nc





k) is a k-dimensional vector. Next, image I
is divided into several non-overlapping blocks with size
n × n pixels, where k = n × n, and each image block is
then transformed into a vector X = (x1, x2, …, xk). For
block encoding, the vector X is matched with the code-
book CB with the lowest distortion, which can be simply
computed as follows:
d Cbtð Þ ¼ Min
∀i
ðd Cið Þ d Cið Þ ¼ cij−xj
  2;
i ¼ 1; 2; …;Ncand j ¼ 1; 2; …; kÞ:
Notably, Cbt denotes the best-matched codeword with
the shortest distance for the vector X. Therefore, the
index value bt of the winner Cbt is recorded to replace
the associated input block in order to achieve the aim of
compression. The other image blocks are subsequently
encoded through the same operation. The VQ encoder
eventually produces a set of indices, also called an index
table, to become the compressed codes of the original
image I. On the opposite side, the VQ decoder uses the
same codebook to translate the received index back for
rebuilding the corresponding image block. That is, the
decoder is required to perform only a simple table
lookup operation to fetch the codewords in accordance
with the indices. VQ has excellent performance with a
low bit rate and a fast decoding process.
2.2 Yang and Shen’s scheme
In 2010, Yang and Shen [18] proposed an image authen-
tication scheme for recovering the tampered image using
VQ indexing. This scheme regards the VQ-compressed
result, which is the index table, as important recovery
information and then embeds it along with authentica-
tion data into the original image. Figure 4 illustrates the
flowchart of Yang and Shen’s embedding procedure. At
the beginning, an image is processed to clear the least
significant 3 bits of each pixel into zero. Subsequently,
that result is partitioned into non-overlapping n × n
image blocks. Each block is sequentially compressed
using a VQ encoder to produce its corresponding VQ
index. Because the codeword corresponding to that
index is highly similar to the image block, it can be the
recovery data of that block in the later recovery proced-
ure. To protect the security of the authentication and re-
covery data, Yang and Shen adopted pixel permutation
to permute the embedding sequence randomly and then
embedded these VQ indices into other pixel bits. Con-
sider, for example, Fig. 4: supposed that the index value
of the first block is 156, the value of which in binary is
(10011100)2. The eight binary bits are hidden into the
permuted random pixels 12, 242, 159, and 90. Each pixel
carries two binary bits of a VQ index into the second
and third least significant bits (LSBs). In fact, Yang and
Shen’s scheme can hide t copies of a VQ index, where t
= (2 × n × n)/(log2|Nc|). This scheme hides authentication
data (a watermark) into the first LSB by using Wong
and Memon’s scheme [16] to create an authenticated
image.
In the tamper detection and recovery procedure,
the received authenticated image is verified to deter-
mine whether it is a fake. The first step is to permute
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the pixel sequence by using the same random key
and then extract three LSBs from each pixel value.
The first LSBs are grouped to form an output binary
watermark, which is then compared with the original
watermark, just as in Wong and Memon’s scheme. If
the received image is modified in any way, either by
changing pixel values or using an inappropriate secret
key, then the extracted watermark bitmap becomes
incorrect and consequently resembles random noise.
The invalid block pixels can be recovered by fetching
the hidden VQ indices from the preceding second
and third LSBs and then decoding them. Because of
lossy VQ compression, the restored image blocks are
very close to the original contents. To avoid the loss
of the hidden VQ bits, this scheme uses t copies of
them to improve the image restoration result. How-
ever, the original watermark may be required for
checking image integrity and performing the image
recovery process. Moreover, the process damages
three LSBs of each image pixel such that the authen-
ticated image quality is drastically reduced.
2.3 Chen and Chen’s scheme
In 2012, Chen and Chen [10] proposed a different solu-
tion to image tamper detection. They efficiently utilized
the properties of data storage and strong error correc-
tion of QR codes to secure the authentication data of an
image. A QR code can hold up to 700 times more data
than a typical barcode can, and it can be produced in
four error correction levels. With the help of error cor-
rection, the authentication data, even when tampered
with, can still be completely restored without error.
Figure 5 depicts the flowchart of Chen and Chen’s em-
bedding procedure. Initially, an original image is used to
perform a discrete wavelet transform to extract a sub-
band of the LL3 block representing a coarse scale of that
image. The LL3 block is then expressed in QR code for-
mat. The authors suggested using the M error correction
level and removing a few regular areas, (e.g., position de-
tection pattern, alignment pattern, and timing pattern)
to generate a smaller QR code. The remaining areas
serve as the authentication data. The original image is
also partitioned into several small and non-overlapping
Fig. 3 Flowchart of vector quantization encoding and decoding
Fig. 4 Flowchart of Yang and Shen’s embedding procedure
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blocks, and a discrete cosine transform (DCT) is per-
formed on each block. This scheme applied a secret key
to randomly select block for data embedding. For each
chosen block, only five high-frequency DCT coefficients
are employed to conceal the aforementioned authentica-
tion data. After the embedding process, these blocks are
finally restored to a pixel-domain authenticated image
by using an inverse DCT process.
During tamper detection, this scheme mainly adopts
the readability of a QR code to verify that the re-
ceived authenticated image is not a fake. First, that
image is processed using a DCT and the same secret
key is used to retrieve the block coefficients that were
already carried with authentication data. Subsequently,
the extracted bits and the regular areas that were re-
moved earlier are filled into the look of a standard
QR code. If the recovered QR code is not readable,
the image may have been modified maliciously. By
contrast, if it is readable, the data drawn out from
that code must be compared with the LL3 block of
the received authenticated image. If the two are iden-
tical, the image has not been tampered with; other-
wise, that image has been modified before. Because of
the advantage of error correction in QR codes, Chen
and Chen’s scheme can be used to verify image integ-
rity. However, it cannot accurately locate the exact re-
gions where the image has been tampered with, and
it exhibits weak recovery capability.
3 Proposed scheme
To address the problems of the two aforementioned
schemes, this section presents the proposed image au-
thentication scheme for exploiting QR codes to protect
the integrity of significant VQ authentication data. The
proposed scheme involves of authentication data gener-
ation procedure, image tamper detection procedure, and
content reconstruction procedure. Before the authenti-
cation data generation procedure is executed, it is neces-
sary to prepare a grayscale image I, called the cover
image, with W × H pixels to be authenticated and a VQ
codebook CB with Nc codewords.
3.1 Authentication data generation procedure
The purpose of this procedure is to generate authentica-
tion data from the cover image I and then conceal them
underneath. For clarity, a flowchart of this procedure is
presented in Fig. 6. An LSB elimination operation is first
performed to clear the least significant 1 bit (1-LSB) of
each pixel to zero for future data embedding. The resulting
image I is then encoded using the VQ technique, where
each image block is the size of n × n pixels. The encoding
result is an index table, consisting of VQ indices, and a VQ
index idxi corresponding to the ith image block. That
index table is regarded as the major authentication and re-
covery data that must be embedded into image I. Next, an
operation of block grouping is introduced to reduce the
volume of the VQ index table. A group Gi is defined by








 2 cþ i−1ð Þ%t  2þ 1; c
¼W=n; t ¼ c=2:
Notably, each index value idxi belongs to only one group.
For example, for a 256 × 256 image and 4 × 4 blocks, there
are four indices, namely idx3, idx4, idx67, and idx68 in
group G2. That is, four adjacent blocks are included in the
same group. From each group Gi, the value idxm is selected
and collected in a set of authentication data Au1, whereas
the value idxm+c+1 is collected in a set of authentication
data Au2. Subsequently, the two sets Au1 and Au2 are
encoded into the corresponding QR code formats Q1 and
Q2, respectively, by using a dedicated code generator. Be-
cause the capacity of QR codes is limited, the block group-
ing operation must be designed in the proposed scheme.
Before data embedding in image I, image blocks must be
rearranged arbitrarily according to a random sequence RS
by using a secret key SK. This means that the seventh
image block could be first used to embed QR codes, then
the fourth image block, and so on; that is, the sequence RS
could be {7, 4, 15, 11, …}. This approach can increase the
security of the authentication data and ensure that
Fig. 5 Flowchart of Chen and Chen’s embedding procedure
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modifications are widely distributed over QR codes. During
the data embedding process, QR codes Q1 and Q2 are hid-
den into the 1-LSB of all pixels. If a module in QR codes is
black, then an image pixel in I remains unchanged; other-
wise, the 1-LSB of an image pixel is set to 1. The preceding
data hiding processes are repeated until all the modules of
the two QR codes are hidden into image I. Finally, an au-
thenticated image Ī corresponding to the original image is
generated. Only the 1-LSB of each pixel is modified; hence,
the acquired image Ī is highly similar to the original image
I. Conventionally, a QR code carrying more data capacity
has a larger size. Because the size of QR modules is not
proportional to the size of the cover image, we extend QR
codes to enlarge part of the quiet zone so that the size of
the QR codes is equal to that of the cover image.
3.2 Image tamper detection procedure
The main purpose of the tamper detection procedure is to
accurately detect and mark the suspected modified re-
gions of an authenticated image Ī*. Figure 7 shows the
flowchart of the proposed tamper detection procedure.
The first process entails dividing image Ī* into numerous
non-overlapping n × n blocks. These blocks are then
scrambled chaotically by using the same sequence RS
through key SK. The next process involves extracting the
hidden data from the 1-LSB of each pixel and then
combining them to form two QR codes Q*1 and Q
*
2. The
codes Q*1 and Q
*
2 carry authentication data Au1 and Au2,
respectively, and these data can be easily acquired by sub-
jecting Q*1 and Q
*
2 to QR decoding. Simultaneously, our
scheme is also to execute the identical data generation
procedure on image Ī* in order to get its specific data Au*1









that an index value appears only in none or one of two
sets. By comparing values in the sets Au*1 and Au
*
2 with
values in the sets Au1 and Au2 one by one, we could easily
discover where the suspected tampered blocks are. If idx*m
in Au*1 is not equal to idxm in Au1, it means that the m-th
block might have been tampered with already; otherwise,
the m-th block is very likely correct and clear. Also, if
idx*m+c+1 in Au
*
2 is not equal to idxm+c+1 in Au2, it means
that m + c + 1-th block might be damaged; otherwise, that
block is an undamaged and clear one.
In a detected result, clear blocks are marked in white in-
tensity whereas damaged ones are marked in black inten-
sity. However, not all of blocks are able to be detected for
content integrity. The main reason is that we introduced
block grouping operation in the prior data generation pro-
cedure. Half of VQ indices is recorded only in two QR
codes. Hence, an additional stage is required to detect the
other blocks in Ī* more accurately. The following six con-
ditions are used to check an image block not including in
Fig. 6 Flowchart of the proposed authentication data generation procedure
Fig. 7 Flowchart of the proposed tamper detection procedure
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the two sets Au1 and Au2 has been modified or not. As
long as one condition meets, this block will be regarded as
a tampered one and marked in black intensity. Finally, we
will derive a detected image of binary format. Figure 8
shows three detecting examples for different tampered
blocks, in which the block drawn in black is damaged one.
In case 1 of Fig. 8, they are detected as tampered ones be-
cause the fifth block meets condition 3 and the second
block meets condition 4. In addition to the second and
fifth blocks, for case 2, the seventh one is also tampered
block on account of condition 5.
Condition 1: Neighboring blocks on left and right are
both tampered.
Condition 2: Neighboring blocks on top and bottom
are both tampered.
Condition 3: Neighboring blocks on top and right are
both tampered.
Condition 4: Neighboring blocks on left and bottom
are both tampered.
Condition 5: Neighboring blocks on top and left are
both tampered.
Condition 6: Neighboring blocks on right and bottom
are both tampered.
3.3 Content reconstruction procedure
After tamper detection procedure, the next process of the
proposed scheme is content reconstruction procedure so
as to restore the image block, especially for the suspected
tampered blocks. This procedure mainly aims at the
blocks marked black in the prior detected image. Initially,
it is necessary to separate detected image into lots of non-
overlapping n × n blocks. If an image block is black, it in-
dicates that the block has been modified and it needs to
be restored. Such modified blocks are classified into two
categories: type 1 and type 2. Type For each block in type
1, its VQ index was taken down in QR codes. Owing to
error correction capability of a QR code, the encoded data,
VQ indices still can be restored completely and losslessly
even though that code suffered from tolerable dirtied and
damaged. Therefore, we can simply use the corresponding
VQ indices to reconstruct the tampered blocks of type 1.
On the contrary, it is a bit hard to recover these dam-
aged blocks in type 2 since their VQ indices are not re-
corded beforehand. Here, we introduced a side-match
prediction to reconstruct those blocks approximately. The
concept of side-match prediction is shown in Fig. 9, where
the middle block X is what we want to restore and its four
adjacent blocks on top, bottom, right, and left directions
are U, D, R, and L, respectively. Among them, pixel values
in blocks U, D, R, and L are clear or have been recon-
structed already. The first step to restore block X is to pre-
dict its surrounding twelve pixels, that is x1, x2, x3, x4, x5,
x8, x9, x12, x13, x14, x15, and x16. The computational for-
mula about prediction are listed below:
x1 ¼ avg l4; u13ð Þ; x2 ¼ u14; x3 ¼ u15; x4
¼ avg r1; u16ð Þ; x5 ¼ l8; x8 ¼ r5;
x13 ¼ avg l16; d1ð Þ; x9 ¼ l12; x12 ¼ r9; x16
¼ avg r13; d4ð Þ; x14 ¼ d2; x15 ¼ d3:
Fig. 8 Detecting example for tampered blocks
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Note that notation avg(S) is an average function to
return the average of the arguments in the set S.
Next step is for the middle four pixels, x6, x7, x10,
and x11, to calculate by using the surrounding known
or reconstructed pixels. Their corresponding formulas
are shown below:
x6 ¼ avg x2; x5ð Þ; x7 ¼ avg x3; x8ð Þ; x10
¼ avg x9; x14ð Þ; x11 ¼ avg x12; x15ð Þ:
Due to the image characteristic that neighboring pixels
have extremely similar values, the prediction technique
is considerably able to recover image content. It is
a b c
d e f
Fig. 10 Six 256 × 256-pixel test images. a. Baboon, b. Cameraman, c. Chart, d. Lena, e. Pepper, f. Sailboat
Fig. 9 A diagram of side-match prediction
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evident that the predicted pixels are inexact and injured,
but they are very similar to the original values in general.
This way is merely unsuitable to the situation of larger
tampering regions. Our scheme is necessary to repeat
the two steps as mentioned above until all the tampered
blocks are reconstructed and a recovered image being
obtained eventually.
4 Experimental results and discussion
In our experiments, six grayscale 256 × 256-pixel images
were served as test images, which are “Baboon,” “Cam-
eraman,” “Chart,” “Lena,” “Pepper,” and “Sailboat” shown
in Fig. 10. Each image was performed on LSB elimin-
ation and vector quantization operations in order to
generate its index table of 4096 indices, where the size
of image blocks is 4 × 4 and the codebook size Nc is 256.
Then, we took 2048 indices from those as the authenti-
cation code to create two QR codes (Q1 and Q2) of
175 × 175 pixels, where an error correction level is L.
Afterward, our proposed scheme embeds two QR codes
into the 1-LSB bits of that image. In order to evaluate
the qualities of authenticated, tampered, and recovered
images, here, the ruling metrics of peak-signal-to-noise
ratio (PSNR) is adopted in the experiments. The PSNR
value indicates the fidelity between original image and
modified image. In general, a higher PSNR value means
that the modified image has better quality. In another
word, that image is extremely similar to the original
image.
Tables 1 and 2 show the experimental results of two
schemes for images “Pepper” and “Baboon,” respectively.
The authenticated images generated by using Yang and
Shen’s scheme [18] and our proposed scheme are all
modified under distinct single tampering attacks. As
shown in the two tables, the size of m ×m pixels is a
modifying area in a tampered image. No matter which
one scheme is adopted, the larger the modifying area is,
the worse the quality of tampered and recovered images
will be, and vice versa. The results explicitly show that
the qualities of the authenticated image in our proposed
scheme reached as high as 51 dB, which is better than
that of Yang and Shen’s scheme. The main reason is that
Yang and Shen’s scheme embeds authentication data
into three LSB bits of each pixel, but the proposed
scheme only embeds them into one LSB bit of each
pixel. On the average, in addition, our proposed scheme
also produces better recovered image quality than that
of Yang and Shen’s scheme, especially for small
Table 2 Results for the image “Baboon” under distinct tampering attacks
Size
(pixels)
Schemes Authenticated image (dB) Tampered image (dB) Recovered image (dB)
15 × 15 Yang and Shen’s scheme 43.45 27.76 38.67
The proposed scheme 51.11 38.83 48.75
20 × 20 Yang and Shen’s scheme 43.45 25.80 38.30
The proposed scheme 51.11 35.59 47.25
25 × 25 Yang and Shen’s scheme 43.45 24.39 35.99
The proposed scheme 51.11 32.23 44.47
30 × 30 Yang and Shen’s scheme 43.45 23.14 31.41
The proposed scheme 51.11 30.08 40.87
Table 1 Results for the image “Pepper” under distinct tampering attacks
Size
(pixels)
Schemes Authenticated image (dB) Tampered image (dB) Recovered image (dB)
15 × 15 Yang and Shen’s scheme 43.13 24.92 43.00
The proposed scheme 51.09 35.19 43.99
20 × 20 Yang and Shen’s scheme 43.13 23.02 40.37
The proposed scheme 51.09 31.24 41.45
25 × 25 Yang and Shen’s scheme 43.13 21.69 39.55
The proposed scheme 51.09 26.99 39.63
30 × 30 Yang and Shen’s scheme 43.13 20.65 39.20
The proposed scheme 51.09 26.80 37.53
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modifying areas. But, our proposed scheme will obtain a
little degraded recovered results when the modifying
area is getting bigger. For this reason, the proposed
scheme is more suitable for small tampering areas. This
is because our proposed scheme is performed based on
block grouping and prediction recovery operations.
In addition to a single tampering attack, we also try to
add more irregular region artifacts to the authenticated
image in order to evaluate the tolerance of QR codes.
Tables 3 and 4 show the comparative results of six test im-
ages using Yang and Shen’s scheme and the proposed
scheme, where there are two and three artifacts in each
test image of Tables 3 and 4, respectively. It is obvious that
the proposed scheme yields better image fidelity with
higher PSNR value than the previous scheme [18] in terms
of authenticated images and recovered images. Figures 11
and 12 present the subjective results based on visual qual-
ity of test images “Pepper” and “Cameraman,” respectively,
by using the proposed scheme. Figures 11b and 12b are
the corresponding tampered image of Figs. 11a and 12a,
in which we modified three irregular image areas. We ob-
served from Figs. 11c to 12c that our scheme is able to de-
tect and indicate tampered locations accurately without
misjudgments occurred. Even though the two QR codes
extracted from tampered image are a little damaged, VQ
index values hidden in it still can be acquired completely
to restore suspected tampered regions as well shown in
Figs. 11f and 12f.
Table 5 compares the numerical results of the six
test images processed using Chen and Chen’s scheme
[10] and the proposed scheme. The results indicate
that the quality of authenticated image generated
from our scheme on average is superior to that gen-
erated from Chen and Chen’s scheme. Moreover, the
previous scheme yields rather degraded quality for the
image “chart” due to the usage of DCT frequency op-
eration. That means that Chen and Chen’s scheme is
inappropriate for binary images. In addition, we also
attempted to modify the authenticated images in the
same manner and then perform the two schemes in
order to recover image content. From Table 5, it can
be clearly seen that the recovered image quality of
our scheme is 41.80 dB on average, whereas Chen
and Chen’s scheme failed in the recovery procedure.
The reason for this situation is that the previous
scheme [10] adopted LL3 subband, which represents
rough contours of an image, of DWT as the authenti-
cation data. That scheme can neither locate tamper-
ing regions nor recover them. In contrast, our
scheme is not only capable of accurately detecting the
suspected modified areas, but almost restoring to
their original states.
Table 4 Comparisons of the schemes under three modifying artifacts
Test images Yang and Shen’s scheme [18] The proposed scheme
Authenticated image (dB) Recovered image (dB) Authenticated image (dB) Recovered image (dB)
Baboon 43.45 34.30 51.11 35.37
Cameraman 42.88 40.54 51.15 47.05
Chart 42.08 32.63 50.78 35.98
Lena 43.24 42.04 51.39 46.99
Pepper 43.13 41.74 51.09 37.29
Sailboat 44.14 37.41 50.98 41.88
Average 43.15 39.16 51.08 40.76
Table 3 Comparisons of the schemes under two modifying artifacts
Test images Yang and Shen’s scheme [18] The proposed scheme
Authenticated image (dB) Recovered image (dB) Authenticated image (dB) Recovered image (dB)
Baboon 43.45 36.00 51.11 37.64
Cameraman 42.88 41.07 51.15 47.15
Chart 42.08 34.13 50.78 37.55
Lena 43.24 42.09 51.39 47.11
Pepper 43.13 41.86 51.09 37.44
Sailboat 44.14 39.79 50.98 43.88
Average 43.15 39.16 51.08 41.80
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Fig. 12 Visual results of the proposed scheme for the image “Cameraman”. a. Authenticated image (PSNR=51.15dB), b. Tampered image
(PSNR=24.59dB), c. Detected result, d. Extracted QR code, e. Embedded QR code, f. Recovered image (PSNR=47.05dB)
a cb
d fe
Fig. 11 Visual results of the proposed scheme for the image “Pepper”. a. Authenticated image (PSNR=51.09dB), b. Tampered image (PSNR=21.05dB),
c. Detected result, d. Extracted QR code, e. Extracted QR code, f. Recovered image (PSNR=37.29dB)
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5 Conclusions
In this paper, we proposed a simple and effective image
authentication scheme based on vector quantization
coding technique. It aims to extract VQ-compressed
codes as the authentication and recovery data of an
image and then convert them into two-dimensional QR
code formats. With the capability of error correction
and tolerance that QR codes have, the important confi-
dential data can be protected completely and errorless.
As shown in the simulation experiments, the perform-
ance of proposed scheme in both image quality and de-
tected result is quite satisfactory. Moreover, it is superior
to the previous schemes especially for recovered images.
Even though we attempt to modify authenticated images
under multiple attacks, detected results of our proposed
scheme are pretty exact, and recovered image quality is
over 40 dB on average. The recovered images are condu-
cive to later application in computer vision. In future,
we will extend this current work to how to authenticate
an image is real even while the photo size is changed.
Furthermore, it is likely to verify the authenticity from
not just one but multiple images because people often
take repetitive photos from the same scene and transmit
them to online repositories.
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